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Abstract 
 
South Korea has experienced spectacular economic growth rates over the last forty years.  
How did this economic “miracle” occur?  Economic growth in Korea can be explained in 
terms of geography, demography, human development or economic convergence 
theories.  However, the debate over the role of legal, political and institutional 
development in Korean economic growth is perhaps the most complex of all.  This paper 
offers an empirical estimation of the explanatory variables of growth, touching upon 
legal, political, cultural and institutional developments, and measures the impact of 
physical and human capital and productivity increases on economic growth.  Using 
growth regressions, I find that the early protection of property rights and, to a lesser 
extent, contract enforcement, was extremely important in achieving ex-post growth in 
South Korea.  On top of that, this East Asian country has benefited from a very successful 
legal tradition from an economic perspective: the German legal system.  The uniform 
composition in terms of race and language has also favored economic growth in Korea 
while political stability has been crucial over the development period.  This last 
proposition is also tested in a second empirical exercise where I estimate the role of 
different factors of production, technical change and productivity growth in South Korea.  
The role of capital accumulation is very important while productivity growth is important 
and the growth in human capital is moderate.  However, productivity is negative only in 
periods of high political instability, reinforcing the link between growth, productivity, 
and political developments. 
 
 
Keywords: Economic growth, Korean economy, political economy, law and economics 
 
JEL Codes: K11, N15, O47, O50, O53 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Francisco Garcia-Blanch is a PhD. candidate in applied economics at Complutense 
University of Madrid and a graduate of the Kennedy School at Harvard.  He has also been 
a reciprocity fellow in the Group in Asian Studies in the University of California at 
Berkeley and a Korea Foundation Fellow in Seoul National University.  
 
Acknowledgements: I am very grateful to Prof. Dwight Perkins for invaluable 
suggestions and support.  I would also like to thank Lorenzo Isla for excellent research 
assistance and Carlos Arteta for sharing his data.  All errors on the paper are, of course, 
only mine. 
 
Francisco Garcia-Blanch 1 Korean Economic Growth 
 
“In human life, economics precedes politics or culture.” 
Park Chung Hee, The Country, The Revolution and I. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
South Korea1 has experienced spectacular economic growth rates over the last 
forty years. The magnitude of the so-called Korean economic “miracle2” is best 
explained by comparing Korea with some African countries in the mid XX 
century.  The per capita GDP of South Korea in 1960 was inferior to that of 
Senegal or Mozambique.  Forty years later, the GDP per capita of Senegal hardly 
reaches $1,650 and that of Mozambique stands at $1,000.  On the other side, the 
last available figures3 indicate that Korea’s GDP per capita has gone up to 
$13,300.  Even after the serious currency and financial crisis of 1997-98, Korea 
remains as one of the economic success stories of the second half of the XX 
century.  How did this economic “miracle” occur?  Can other countries replicate 
Korea’s strategy successfully?  The debate on the sources of this magnificent 
growth is by no means over.  As I will discuss in this paper, economic growth in 
Korea can be explained in terms of geography, demography, human 
development or economic convergence theories.  However, the debate over the 
role of legal, political and institutional development in Korean economic growth 
is perhaps the most complex of all.  Many social scientists that have had a chance 
to study Korea would agree that politics have played a key role in the economic 
development of this resource-poor country.  Are there ways to test this 
empirically? 
This paper begins by explaining the initial conditions that Korea departed from 
in the early fifties and sixties and contrasts them with (1) starting point 
                                                                 
1 The official name of South Korea is the Republic of Korea (ROK).  South Korea is also referred to in this 
paper as Korea. 
2 World Bank (1993) 
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conditions in other countries and (2) current research on the determinants of 
economic growth. 
The second part of the paper gathers the most relevant hypotheses that 
economists and political scientists have elaborated to explain Korean economic 
development.  Also, in this part I try to link up these theories with the different 
factors that have contributed to the creation of human capital and the 
development of legal and economic institutions in Korea over the past forty 
years. 
The third part of this essay is an empirical analysis of political and institutional 
determinants of economic growth.  Although I am aware of the limitations 
involved, I do a first experiment measuring the year and country fixed effects in 
a time-series regression analysis for a group of 80 countries over the 1980-96 
period. In this experiment I look at the following political and institutional 
variables: law and order, bureaucratic delay, contract enforcement, quality of the 
bureaucracy, and corruption. Then, I use regression analysis in a cross-section of 
countries à la Barro (1991) to try to determine which political and institutional 
factors are especially relevant to economic growth in general and to Korean 
development in particular.  In this experiment, I look at governance indicators 
for a sample of countries and I test the impact of the quality of regulation, 
accountability and voice, government effectiveness, political instability and 
violence, lack of corruption, and rule of law on economic growth.  I also take a 
close look at the legal system and at some cultural variables. 
In the fourth section, I use the growth accounting framework of measuring total 
productivity growth on South Korean economic development, I put the results in 
context, I try to link up the arguments from the previous sections with these 
estimations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 Central Intelligence Agency. World Fact Book 2000. http:\\www.cia.gov 
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2. INITIAL CONDITIONS AND DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
The first issue to look at when analyzing the initial conditions of Korean 
economic growth is probably geography.  In contrast with economies in Africa or 
Latin America, there does not seem to be a negative regional bias on economic 
growth for a country located in Asia.  On top of that, Korea is quite far from the 
equator and, according to Sala-i-Marti (1997), being far from the tropics has a 
positive effect on growth (See also Sachs, 2000).  Sachs and Warner (1995) show 
that economies with a high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP in 19704 
grew slowly during the next 20 years and claim that this negative relationship 
holds true, even after controlling for many variables that other authors have 
found important for economic growth. 
A second key determinant of economic growth is clearly demography.  Bloom, 
Canning, and Malaney (1999) have examined links between demographic change 
and economic growth in Asia during 1965-90.  They concluded that the overall 
rate of population growth had a small effect on economic growth.  Instead, they 
find that changes in life expectancy, age structure, and population density have 
had a significant impact on growth rates and even claim that demographic effects 
can explain most of the Asian economic "miracle."  Another important issue is 
that Korea has remained untouched by major epidemics over the past forty 
years.  In economic terms, this means that the economy has enjoyed a steady 
growth in the supply of labor5 of about 2.96% per year between 1970 and 2000. 
Rodrik (1995) also thinks that initial conditions have been key to Korea [and 
Taiwan] and has elaborated a table estimating primary and secondary enrolment 
ratios and literacy rates (see table 1).  This estimation takes the economic level of 
Korea and Taiwan as a reference point and it contrasts it with countries of similar 
                                                                 
4 This is the base year in the analysis. 
5 This estimation was done by the author using data from Korea’s National Statistical Office. 
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characteristics.  The conclusion that can be extracted from these figures is 
evident: Korea may have started with a low GDP per capita, but the population's 
educational level was extraordinarily high.  Also, high primary school 
enrollment levels at an early stage of development indicate in fact that literacy 
ratios are likely to improve over time as older generations are replaced. Another 
important point is that inequality was very low in Korea and did not lead to 
major conflicts in the early stages of development6.  You (1998) argues that Japan, 
Taiwan and South Korea are the only countries in East Asia that have legitimate 
claims to low inequality and that they had a special ability to translate high profit 
shares into high savings and investment rates.  He further claims that low 
inequality and high profit shares coexisted primarily due to the unusually even 
distribution of wealth, establishing the possible link between egalitarian wealth 
distribution and growth7. 
 
Table 1. Educational Indicators in 1960 
 Primary school enrollment 
ratio 
Secondary school enrollment 
ratio 
Literacy rate 
 Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual 
Korea 57% 94% 10% 17% 31% 71% 
Taiwan 67% 96% 12% 28% 36% 54% 
Source: Rodrik (1995) 
The neoclassical theory of economic growth indicates that there should be some 
sort of convergence among different economies.  According to Barro (1999), the 
convergence property indicates that “the lower the starting level of real per 
capita GDP, the higher the predicted growth rate.”  Korea’s GDP per capita was 
lower than Senegal or Mozambique in 1960, so it would seem reasonable to argue 
                                                                 
6 Booth (1999) attributes both the equality and the educational progress to the Japanese colonial legacy. 
7 Fields and Yoo (2000) argue that the labor income equality in South Korea during the development period 
has been, at least, exceptional.  In this empirical analysis they find that the most important factors in 
explaining the level of labor income inequality are job tenure, gender, years of education, and occupation, 
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that convergence is also part of the growth puzzle.  Furthermore, Koo, Kim and 
Kim (1998) studied the convergence of regional incomes in Korea and found that 
it was consistent with the neoclassical growth model, but it occurred much faster 
(4% to 6% per year) than expected.  Thus, convergence at the regional level 
domestically may have also had a positive effect of the fast convergence between 
Korea and the developed economies by encouraging regional balanced growth.   
 
Table 2. Growth variables in South Korean Development 
Variables strongly correlated with Growth Effect Analysis for Korea 
1960-2000 
Effect on 
Korean growth 
GDP per capita level in 1960 - Low  + 
Primary school enrollment in 1960 + Very high (94%) + 
Life expectancy in 1960 + Middle (54 yrs.) + 
Latin America/Africa Dummies - Located in Asia + 
Absolute latitude (far from equator l ine) + Far (38 parallel) + 
Real exchange rate distortions(see graph in appendix) - Fixed, then pegged + 
Equipment investment (ß=0.2175) + High investment + 
Non-equipment investment (ß=0.0562) + High + 
Fraction of primary products in total exports - Very low + 
Number of years the economy has been open + Since 1969* (31)    + 
Rule of Law† + In place since 1960 + 
Political Rights + Low till early 90s - 
Civil Liberties + Mid. Till early 90s - 
Number of Revolutions - 1 coup d’état (1961) + 
War Dummy - No war after 1953 + 
Degree of Capitalism + Medium - 
Sources: variables on growth by Sala-i-Marti (1997); variables on Korea taken from World 
Development Indicators 2000, Rodrik (1995), Clifford (1996), Krueger (1985), and Polity IV 
database. 
Notes: * This date is the one assigned in the Sachs and Warner openness index (The datafile can 
be downloaded at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/Warner's%20Files/sachswarneropen.xls)  
† Shin and Chang (1998) state that “the existence of a number of substantive economic laws in 
1960 is irrefutable.” 
 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Rhee (1997) have found that the devaluation of the 
Korean won has been in general expansionary for the economy.  In developing 
economies, this is not normally the case as devaluations tend to be contractionary 
(graph 6 in appendix 1 gives an idea of the magnitude of the devaluation).  These 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
while the most important variables in explaining the change in income inequality are years of education, 
industry, occupation, and potential experience. 
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exchange rate distortions have thus had a positive impact on South Korean 
economic growth. 
Table 2 includes a set of empirically tested variables that, according to Sala-i-
Marti (1997), are correlated to economic growth.  I have also included the 
corresponding values for Korea and whether these variables have affected 
economic growth positively or negatively in this East Asian peninsula. 
Most of the geographic, demographic, and economic data points listed in table 2 
can help to explain Korea’s impressive economic growth during the 1962-97 
period.  On the other hand, it is much harder to come to a conclusion on the 
impact of political variables on economic growth.  True, there was no war after 
1953 in the peninsula and there was only one coup d’état at the beginning of the 
development process in 1961 and a substantial degree of political stability except 
for the 1979-80 period.  However, most observers would probably agree as well 
that there were little political rights and civil liberties in Korea during military 
rule.  Also, the degree of capitalism in Korea was mixed due to the complex 
business-government relationship and the great involvement of the state in the 
economy. 
 
Table 3. Variables not contributing to growth in South Korean development 
Variables NOT strongly correlated with growth Analysis for Korea 1962-2000 
Government spending Low 
Financial sophistication Low 
Inflation rate Low 
Inflation rate variance Low 
Measures of openness: outward orientation  High 
Measures of openness: tariff restrictions High average tariffs for consumer 
goods, low for capital goods 
Scale effects: total area, total labor force Small area, labor force over 25m 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization None 
Sources: variables on growth by Sala-i-Marti (1997); variables on Korea taken from World 
Development Indicators 2000, Rodrik (1995), Clifford (1996), Krueger (1985). 
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Ghatak (1998) uses vector autoregression (VAR), Bayesian VAR and vector-error 
correction models to find that growth in South Korea comes from income, 
investment, export growth, government spending, and exchange rate policies.  In 
this regard, the study by Sala-i-Marti (1997) points out that government spending 
is not among the variables correlated with growth, although Cheng and Lai 
(1997) find a bidirectional causality between government expenditure and 
economic growth in Korea during the 1953-94 period. 
Another important issue is to allude to variables that do not seem related to 
economic growth to avoid making the wrong arguments.  Again, according to 
Sala-i-Marti (1997), government spending, financial sophistication, inflation8, 
openness, scale effects and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are not relevant for 
economic growth.  However, other authors would probably disagree with some 
of these findings.  In particular, it could be easily argued that there are 
endogenous effects of these non-relevant variables on the variables formerly 
classified as relevant.  For example, having a unified ethnic and linguistic group 
probably contributes to political stability, which in turn has a positive and 
significant effect on economic growth9.  However, there are also some pure 
economic arguments in this regard such as lower transaction costs or smaller 
information asymmetries.  Other social scientists (Hattori and Sato, 1997) have 
proposed that the differences between Korea and other Asian countries are based 
on the relationship between government and society and the mechanism of social 
network formation.  The existence of a single ethnolinguistic group has most 
likely had a significant impact in this regard. 
To the departure conditions and growth determinants discussed, I should add 
two decisive factors in the international political economy of the region.  In the 
first place, United States foreign policy gave clear priority to the economic 
                                                                 
8 Barro (1999) disagrees and estimates that the effect of inflation on growth is significantly negative.  This 
is especially true for countries that have experienced high rates of inflation. 
9 In contrast, Booth (1999) points out that South East Asian governments have been able to focus less on 
growth related policies and have tended to favor inter-ethnic redistribution of wealth. 
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development of Korea to counterbalance Soviet power in the north of the 
peninsula.  This meant multilateral foreign aid and technical assistance.  The 
transfer of technology from the United States and Japan to Korea can be 
considered part of the economic aid package. It is, in some way, the result of the 
strategic geopolitical position of the peninsula and it had a significant impact on 
the Korean economic take-off.  Secondly, the presence of American troops in 
South Korea gave significant stability to the country, and it allowed Park to 
divert military resources into the economy.  Stable deterrence10 played a decisive 
role, since it reduced the possibilities of a military attack of North Korea once the 
two superpowers, the Soviet Union and USA, had taken stable positions in the 
peninsula.  Somehow, South Korea became a free-rider in the field of defense 
compared to their northern neighbors11.  The permanent presence of American 
troops in South Korean territory not only allowed but rather pressed the state to 
divert its resources to develop the country.  However, it is uncertain whether 
more emphasis on the military, including a higher spending in defense R&D, 
would have had a more positive contribution to Korean technological progress 
than the deviation of those resources to pursue a far-reaching industrial policy.  
Heo (1999) provides a first approach to this issue in an empirical study where he 
claims that “the overall economic effects of defense spending on [South Korean] 
growth are negative although they seem to be indirect or delayed.”  This finding 
would support the argument that Korea has benefited economically from some 
free-riding in the defense and security domain. 
                                                                 
10 This term refers to the mutual threat of self destruction that existed during the Cold War.  No party dares 
to attack first because mutual self destruction is ensured by second strike capabilities.  See Mandelbaum, 
M. (1979), “The Foundation of Stable Deterrence” in The Nuclear Question: The United States and 
Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, N.Y. pp. 69-98. 
11 For example, South Korean men have to go through 2 years of mandatory military training while North 
Koreans have to serve for 7 years in the army. 
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3. HYPOTHESES ON KOREAN ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Over the last two decades, economists have tried to provide a coherent, but not 
always comprehensive, explanation to the great economic success of East Asia in 
general and of South Korea in particular.  However, there is a deep intellectual 
cleavage12 with regard to the fundamental reasons behind the economic growth 
of Korea.  The neoclassical explanation, initially proposed by Frank, Kim and 
Westphal (1975) and then by Krueger (1979), focuses on the import-substitution 
policies started at the end of the fifties and on the export-led development 
strategy13.  New growth theory studies (Doganlar and Fisunoglu, 1999 or Glasure 
and Lee, 1999) add the existence of a bidirectional causality between exports and 
output growth for the Korean case.  The government maintained high protection 
levels thus allowing little trade on consumer products, while it controlled 
financial markets completely.  Also, loans and subsidies were targeted at 
strategic industries and companies.  The South Korean government stimulated 
exports through competitive devaluations of the currency and liberalized the 
import regime little by little.  These government measures were supplemented 
with high interest rates, a macroeconomic policy that definitively contributed to 
maintain a stable business climate, and public investment in infrastructure and 
human capital (Krueger, 1979 and 1985).  Nam and Kim (2000) also attribute the 
impressive growth of domestic savings between 1960 and 1995 to the trade 
reforms and the growth in exports.  From a neoclassical perspective, this story 
has a great internal coherence and responds to the purest economic orthodoxy. 
Under this view, the state simply seems to contribute to economic growth by 
designing the right policies and carrying out investments in infrastructure, while 
the private sector responds to the government’s economic incentives in an 
                                                                 
12 This is just a friendly use of Stein Rokkan’s term social “cleavage.” 
13 Others (see Bhattacharya, 1997) have argued that exports and non-oil world supply shocks each account 
for no more than a fifth of the variation in output in Korea, supporting the view that exports were not the 
single driving force behind Korean economic growth. 
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environment of great political and financial stability.  In short, this explanation 
broadly suggests that both the state and the private sector remained within their 
traditional roles during the development process. 
However, other authors in the field of political economy such as Amsden (1989) 
or Haggard (1990) do not agree with the explanation previously proposed and 
they insist on the enormous role of the Korean state in the economic 
development of the country.  In fact, this revisionist explanation makes a special 
emphasis in the government’s departure from its original functions.  These 
authors suggest that the South Korean government intervened in an 
extraordinarily active way in the economy and in the technological development 
of the country.  The Heavy and Chemical Industry drive14 has been a matter of 
great controversy among economists devoted to the study of South Korean 
development.  Some consider it to be a turning point in Korean modern 
economic history and a crucial step in the ex-post economic growth (Amsden, 
1989), while others are more concerned about the investment distortions that it 
may have caused (Ueda, 1999) and its adverse impact on growth. 
Another hypothesis regarding South Korean economic growth was proposed by 
Alwyn Young (1992 and 1995).  The main argument here comes from Young’s 
estimates of total factor productivity growth (TFPG) in different Asian countries.  
According to Young, productivity in Korea increased only at 1.7% annually 
during the period 1966-1990, while the economy grew at a pace of at least 6% per 
annum.  These figures indicate that the main contribution to economic growth 
was the accumulation of factors.  That is to say, Korea grew thanks to an increase of 
production factors including incorporation of new labor force to the economy, a 
high level of savings, and capital accumulation.  A more crude interpretation of 
these results, according to Krugman15, is that Koreans worked harder but not 
smarter.  This hypothesis clearly downplays technical change as a source of 
                                                                 
14 See Stern, Kim, Perkins, and Yoo (1995) for a detailed analysis. 
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growth, since it assumes that economic growth was not the result of a significant 
increase in productivity but instead the consequence of introducing idle labor 
force and capital into the economy.  However, it is important to notice that 
although the growth in productivity was not spectacular according to Young’s 
calculation, this annual increase in productivity was not lower than the one the 
experienced by many industrialized countries16. 
Recent research in dual TFPG by Hsieh (1999) throws a new hypothesis17.  For 
Hsieh, the macroeconomic statistics offered by the different Asian countries 
present numerous problems when calculating technical change.  Hsieh believes 
that we have to leave aside the study of quantities and that we have to 
concentrate on the data of prices because it is more reliable.  According to Hsieh, 
if an important technical change had not occurred and all the growth was due to 
factor accumulation, return to capital should have fallen dramatically during the 
last forty years.  However, the data demonstrates that this was not the case in 
some Asian countries.  Hsieh indicates that, at least in the case of Singapore, 
estimates of dual TFPG suggest that productivity has played a decisive paper in 
the economic development of this Asian dragon.  He also insists in the possible 
applicability of this analysis to other Asian countries.  However, Hsieh is not able 
to find a similar pattern in Korea, so the validity of this hypothesis in this 
discussion is quite limited.   
Dani Rodrik (1995) has pointed out that export incentives played a very 
important role in the economic development of Korea.  Yet, the fact that these 
measures were adopted half a decade before the export boom took place 
indicates that these incentives could not be the fundamental reason for the 
economic take-off.  The existence of this time lag has led Rodrik to elaborate an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 See, for example, Krugman, Paul "The myth of Asia's miracle ", Foreign Affairs, Nov. 1994 or Krugman, 
Paul, “What ever happened to the Asian miracle?”, Fortune, Aug. 18, 1997. 
16 The comparable figure for the same period (1966-90) in the US was 0.6% and in Japan 2.57%.  This 
calculations have been made by the author based on data provided by Prof. Ryuzo Sato. 
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alternative explanation centered in what he denominates a coordination failure.  
For Rodrik, the key factor that separates South Korea from Mozambique or 
Senegal in 1960 is the initial conditions of their social infrastructure.  That is to 
say, a relatively high literacy rate and a high educational level compared to these 
two African countries.  Also, the distribution of wealth in the Korean society did 
not show the same inequality patterns that could be found in Latin America.  
This factor, Rodrik argues, isolated the government from social demands and it 
allowed the adoption of aggressive investment policies without having to 
address issues of historical justice.  This last explanation clearly downplays the 
fact that South Korea was a dictatorship.  In my opinion, this factor is much more 
important when explaining why a government is more or less insulated from 
social pressures. 
The argument presented by Rodrik is based on the impossibility of an economic 
take off under a decentralized economic regime because demand does not exist.  
However, through coordinated subsidies to key industries, the government 
could overcome this difficulty by creating supply and demand in a coordinated 
way, thus expanding the production possibilities frontier of the country.  Thanks 
to an exogenous increase in the return to capital, imports of capital goods 
expanded.  The increase in the level of imports necessarily propelled an increase 
in the volume of exports necessary to generate foreign currency that would 
finance the acquisition of capital goods.  Rodrik (1995b) also suggests that 
exports in East Asia have been driven by an increase in the profitability of 
investment instead of the other way around.  He argues that since saving rose 
alongside the desired investment, the investment boom was necessarily 
accompanied by an investment boom both in imports and export.  This is 
consistent with the argument presented by Hong (1997) in an empirical study.  
This author suggests that the success of the manufacturing sector in South Korea 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
17 Some authors (see, for example, Sing and Trieu, 1999) have reviewed Young’s estimates and argue that 
the Korean growth experience can not be only explained in terms of factor accumulation, but their results 
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owes a lot to foreign capital, since FDI18 alone accounts for almost 20% of the 
growth in this sector.  The increase in profitability may have caused this surge in 
inflows of foreign capital. 
 
Table 4. The five major hypotheses on Korean economic growth 
Explanation Author Engine of growth 
Factor accumulation hypothesis Young Accumulation of labor and capital  
Neoclassical hypothesis Frank, Kim and Westphal 
Krueger, World Bank 
Export promotion and import 
substitution 
Coordination failure hypothesis Rodrik Coordination between private and 
public sectors by government 
Revisionist hypothesis Amsden 
Haggard 
Governmental intervention, dirigisme 
 Dual TFPG hypothesis Hsieh Increase in productivity 
Source: Adapted from Garcia-Blanch (2000). 
 
 HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT 
All hypotheses explaining Korean economic growth coincide in stressing the 
importance of the human factor.  Clearly, the quality of human capital in Korea 
at the beginning of the development process is very high for its level of economic 
development, as the estimates of Rodrik show (table 1).  Another fact that is 
usually ignored is the low literacy rate after the Korean War.  According to 
Kim19, over 78% of the population did not know how to read or write in 1953, a 
number that could be more in line with Rodrik’s estimates.  However, Kim’s 
(1997) figure is hard to believe if we consider that by the end of the Rhee 
administration a few years later illiteracy rate stood at 27.9%. This would mean 
that half of the Korean people learned to read and write merely in seven years, a 
remarkable, unique, and highly unlikely social achievement.  In any case, it 
seems reasonable to assert that, although Rhee’s administration is usually 
perceived negatively in terms of economic development, this period played an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
have not been broadly acknowledged. 
18 Foreign Direct Investment 
19 Kim Linsu. (1997) 
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important role in later development because it helped to consolidate an 
important base of human capital.  The government of Park continued a very 
aggressive educational policy and was able to practically eliminate illiteracy in 
Korea by the mid-seventies.   
Park found a way to take advantage of this high educational base to develop 
tertiary education.  A strong impulse in scientific and technological policy would 
have been of little help without the adequate human resources.  This way, large 
numbers of Korean students were sent abroad and then came back to companies, 
universities and research centers to start different scientific projects20.  The state 
invested heavily as well in the domestic development of tertiary education.  
Korea went from having 38,400 university students21 in 1953 to 1,150,000 in 1994.  
The importance of state intervention in tertiary education is also reflected by the 
fact that the best university in Korea, Seoul National University, is public22.  
What makes the Korean educational policy especially interesting is the enormous 
number of engineers and scientists that it has been able to produce in a short 
period of time, which would have been unlikely if illiteracy rate was so high in 
1953.  In the last stage of Park’s government, Korea had already four times more 
engineers and scientists per million people than Brazil or Singapore and seven 
times more than India (see table 5).  Green, Ashton, James, and Sung (1999) point 
out that the expansion in vocational education that followed the Heavy Chemical 
and Industrialization Plan (HCIP) was directly supervised and coordinated by 
the Blue House itself23.  According to these researchers, it was “a kind of package 
with the aim of producing graduates to go straight into the factories.”  Today, the 
Korean government still supervises the curriculum, rules, examinations, staffing, 
                                                                 
20 In proportion to the size of the population, only Taiwan has sent more students over to the United States 
than Korea. 
21 Office of Statistics, Tonggyero bon Hankukeo Baljachiu (Korea’s progress in Statistics) (Seoul: Office of 
Statistics, 1995) 
22 Lim (1999) argues that Korean universities in general have played a key role in human capital formation 
and that this has significantly enhanced industrial productivity.  Green et al. (1999) discuss the importance 
of the role of the state in this process and conclude that it was instrumental. 
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and resource allocation in both the educational and training systems, clearly 
reinforcing the view of the key role that it still plays in human capital formation.   
 
Table 5. Human Capital Indicators 
  Korea Brazil Singapore India 
1960s 6900 5600 NA 1900 Scientists and Engineers per 
million 1970s 22000 5900 5200 3000 
1976 325 NA 263 46 
1978 398 208 317 NA 
1984 921 362 908 134 
Scientists and Engineers in 
R&D per million 
1995 2235 168 2318 NA 
Source: Amsden (1989) and World Development Indicators (2000) for data on 1984 and 1995. 
 
Another important point with regard to education has been the egalitarian 
nature of training and skill development opportunities promoted by the 
government since the mid sixties (Green et al., 1999).  The competitive system set 
in place since Park’s administration has contributed both to a relatively equal 
income distribution and to a broader acceptance of the social structure in South 
Korea.  The link between these byproducts of the educational policy and political 
stability are likely to be strong, thus having an additional positive effect on 
growth.  On the other side, this does not mean that there has been no social 
unrest in Korea.  Social unrest has in fact been strong but it has had more to do 
with labor unrest regarding the limitation of workers’ rights and student 
demonstrations for political change.   
In the light of this evidence, it is difficult to agree with Krugman (1994) when he 
states that Asian countries have not learned to work smarter.  It may be true that 
Korea has grown mainly through the accumulation of factors, but it may be 
reasonable to state that that human capital has become substantially more 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
23 The Blue House is the equivalent of the White House in the US, or the highest office in the executive 
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productive.  Furthermore, a growth in the number of engineers and scientists of 
such a magnitude necessarily has to have very positive effects on both product 
and process technologies.  
 
Table 6. Scientific and technical journal articles (per capita) 
 1981 1985 1989 1992 1995 
Korea, Rep.  0.0000043  0.0000104  0.0000215  0.0000330  0.0000659 
Brazil  0.0000116  0.0000108  0.0000121  0.0000166  0.0000173 
Singapore  0.0000534  0.0001164  0.0001545  0.0002047  0.0002983 
India  0.0000167  0.0000125  0.0000101  0.0000096  0.0000084 
Note: Only data for years shown was available. 
Source: Estimated by the author using the World Development Indicators CD-ROM, 2000.  
 
The number of scientific journal articles per capita in South Korea grew 1518% 
(100% is the base year) from 1981 through 1995, or a 20% increase on average per 
year over a decade and a half.  The numbers for Singapore are 559% and 12% 
respectively, while Brazil stands at 150% and 3%.  India, on the other hand, 
experienced a negative growth of –4.5% per year in the number of scientific and 
technical publications over the same period.  Clearly, South Korea has had an 
impressive human capital development.  However, as I point out in section five, 
while the stock of human capital grew 45% between 1970 and 2000, physical 
capital grew by 3449%.  This means that physical capital grew24 during this 
period at a compound rate of 12.7% while human capital grew only at 1.26% per 
year on average during the same years. 
 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 
So far, I have stressed the importance of the Rhee government in developing the 
literacy base that allowed the latter creation of a solid educational system under 
Park.  Another key achievement of Rhee’s government was the redefinition of a 
legal base.  The Civil Code, enacted in 1958 and effective as of January 1, 1960 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
branch. 
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gathers most of the basic laws governing property rights25.  The Codes of Civil 
(1953) and Criminal (1954) Procedure and the Copyright Act (1957) are a legacy 
as well of the Rhee regime.  Concerning the legal system up to the early 1960s, 
Shin and Chang (1998) conclude that “although a set of fundamental laws was in 
place at that time, the lack of enforcement institutions and coherent government 
policies […] makes it difficult to classify the nature of the laws” and “regulation 
of the financial and commercial sectors was quite strict and the government often 
seemed to act quite arbitrarily in implementing changes” although they also 
acknowledged the particularly positive attitude of the law towards property 
rights, a key variable of economic growth. 
Finally, the early Labor Union Act, the Labor Standards Act and the Labor 
Dispute Adjustment Act were inspired in the American legal model of labor 
protection in 1953.  However, enforcement of worker’s rights was not effective in 
practice, which translated into long working hours and poor working conditions.  
Park’s administration continued this policy, as the government restricted both 
collective bargaining and collective action under the Special Act of National 
Security of 1971, effectively locking up a disciplined, hard-working, enduring, 
cheap labor force.  In 1987, the new democratizing wave pushed for reforms and 
established minimum wage standards, re-allowed collective action and 
bargaining, and significantly enhanced workers’ rights.  However, the situation 
for the Korean working woman did not improve that dramatically.  Seguino 
(1997) presents econometric evidence supporting the hypothesis that women’s 
weaker position limited their ability to bargain wage raises that made up for 
increased productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. 
The Korean Commercial Code enacted in 1962 enabled the creation of limited 
partnerships, general partnerships, stock companies and limited companies.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
24 The stock of physical capital takes into account the depreciation. In this case, I assumed 5% yearly 
depreciation. 
25 Prior to that, the Japanese Civil and Commercial Codes, texts based on the germanic legal tradition, were 
in place. 
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the early 1960, conciliation and mediation were not available as dispute solving 
mechanisms and the Arbitration Act was passed in 1966.  This implies that 
informal institutions for dispute resolution did not exist until the late sixties.  
Another important issue is that the principle of separation of powers (trias 
politica) engrained in the Constitution was not applied in practice and law was 
seen as an agent of political regimentation (Shin and Chang, 1998).  Still, the same 
authors point out that “as far as ordinary civil cases were concerned, judges still 
appeared to maintain a certain level of independence.”   
The influence of Confucian values26 is also inherently ascribed to the Korean 
legal system, making customary law very relevant in some specific contexts 
where the law was not precisely defined.  An example from Hahm27 is 
particularly illustrative of the social justice flavor of the Korean legal tradition: 
“If a destitute family illegally built a shack on another’s land, 80.25% [of the 
people interviewed] would let them stay, and only 7.15% would force them to 
leave.  If the land was needed, and the family refused to move, only 14.76% 
would have resorted to the law, while 40.68% would have given the family 
money to move.” 
Another important pillar of economic growth is competition and, in this regard, 
the first attempt to establish some sort of competition law28 in Korea did not 
come until 1975, although the main worry behind the enactment of this law was 
stabilizing prices.  The first text addressing the problem of monopolistic 
competition29 actually had to wait until 1980.  Notice that the economic 
development period in South Korea is normally considered to start in 1960-61, 
meaning that the word “perfect competition” has not been in the jargon of 
Korean lawmakers for at least half of the development process.  In fact, the 
                                                                 
26 In this context we may interpret Confucian values as favoring harmony over argumentation or dispute. 
27 Hahm Pyong-Choon in Choi Chong-Ko (1989), “Traditional Korean Law and its Modernization,” 
Transactions of Royal Asiatic Society. 
28 The actual name of this piece of legislation is the “Price Stabilization and Fair Trade Act” and jointly 
addressed the issues of price stabilization and the promotion of free competition in the market place. 
29 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (1980) 
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Monopoly regulation and Fair Trade Act (1980) is the first legal document that 
aims at “[...] promoting the balanced development of the Korean economy.”30 
After the stock market crash of 1962, the government also tried to redefine the 
framework for the development of capital markets.  However, until the mid 
seventies, most companies ignored the benefits of going public, and this led to 
the introduction of significant measures to reduce the reliance of the corporate 
sector on private loans as a source of financing.  The consequences of these failed 
financial policies of the early sixties are well-known, but little was done to 
improve the situation over the next thirty years.  Little equity capital, excessive 
leverage, too many bad loans and, of course, a financial and currency crisis in 
1997. 
In sum, Korea had a significant legal base at the beginning of the development 
period and, most importantly, has had laws enforcing the protection of property 
rights for the past forty years.  On a more negative note from a social perspective, 
legislation protecting workers’ rights was not enforced, although it is hard to say 
that this may have had a negative impact on economic growth.  On the contrary, 
less workers’ protection may probably the prospects of economic growth, 
particularly for a developing country.  A final, but more controversial issue is 
competition law.  While perfect competition is a usual assumption in economic 
models, it seems quite obvious that Korea has managed development very 
successfully without anti-monopolistic regulations.  Studying the legal 
developments in South Korea actually makes quite a compelling case against the 
neoclassical view, and reinforces significantly the revisionist arguments. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
The role of institutions is key to understanding South Korean economic 
development.  A key part of any institutional analysis is the role of the 
bureaucracy.  In that regard, Cheng, Haggard, and Kang (1998) argue that 
                                                                 
30 Shin and Chang (1998) 
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political leaders in South Korea had an interest in reforming the civil service to 
carry out programmatic initiatives started by Park Chung Hee.  According to 
their study, the Korean government tried to introduce meritocratic elements in 
the design of the new public administration, while keeping insulated agencies to 
coordinate overall economic and other policies.   On the other side, Lim (1998) 
emphasizes the role of coalition in the selection of industrial policies and the 
changing coalitional structure between power groups in the restructuring 
process.  Some institutions have been particularly strong in the case of Korea and 
others especially weak, but the links between these and economic growth are 
hard to establish.  Rodrik (2000) argues that there are five types of important 
institutions for growth: property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for 
macroeconomic stabilization, institutions of social insurance, and institutions of 
conflict management.  Out of these five, Korea has enjoyed good property rights 
and conflict management institutions, as well as fairly good institutions for 
macroeconomic stabilization.  Social insurance was provided by companies and 
sometimes the government but the most important social insurer is probably 
extended family network.  Finally, in the light of the legal evidence it is hard to 
argue that Korea had good regulatory institutions that ensured a competitive 
environment in different sectors. 
In fact, some authors (see Lee C. H., 1999) argue that the demise of institutions 
after the mid 1970s brought “an institutional hiatus with serious consequences to 
the economy,” and that Korea is in urgent need of reforming its old informal 
institutions.  This may be particularly true with regard to the regulatory 
framework, although there is little evidence of high quality regulatory 
institutions until the mid nineties.  A reinterpretation of Lee CH (1999) may be 
that regulation set in place in the sixties and seventies worked well in a 
controlled, protected economy but did not work as well in the more competitive 
and deregulated environment of the nineties.  Table 7 gathers most of the key 
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legal, financial, industrial, and technological institutional developments over the 
past fifty years in South Korea. 
 
 
Table 7. Institution building in South Korea 
Decade Legal developments. Industrial/legal 
developments 
Financial 
institutional dev. 
S&T Institutional 
develop. 
1950-60s Constitution (1948) 
Labor Union & Labor 
Standards Acts (1953) 
Criminal Code (1953) 
Codes of Civil (1953) and 
Criminal (1954) Procedure. 
Copyright Act (1957) 
Civil Code (1958) 
Commercial Code (1962) 
Bankruptcy Law (1962) 
Pollution Prevention (1963) 
Arbitration Act (1966) 
Mechanical 
Engineering Industry 
Promotion Act (1967) 
Ship-building Industry 
Promotion Act (1967) 
Electronic Engineering 
Promotion Act (1968) 
 
Bank of Korea Act 
(1950) 
Privatization of 
Commercial Banks 
(1957)  
Foreign Capital 
Inducement Act (1960) 
Securities and 
Exchange Law (1962) 
Act Relating to Capital 
Market Support (1998) 
Korea Investment 
Corporation (KIC) 
(1968) 
MOST 
S&T information 
center 
1970s Competition Law (1975) Oil & Chemical 
Industry Promotion 
Act( 1970) 
Non-steel Metal 
Industry Promotion Act 
(1970) 
Going Public 
Encouragement Act 
(1973) 
Securities and 
Exchange 
Commission (1977) 
Securities Transaction 
Tax (1979) 
Public research 
institutes 
1980s Monopoly regulation and Fair 
Trade Act (1980) 
New Copyright Act (1986) 
Declaration of Democratic 
Reforms (1987) 
Engineering Industry 
Development Act 
(1986) 
 S&T commissions  
R&D 
cooperatives 
1990s   Foreign Investment 
Stimulation Measures 
(1994) 
Financial Supervisory 
Commission (1998) 
Cooperative R&D 
system 
Source: STEPI (1995), Shin and Chang (1998). 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF SOUTH KOREAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
In this part of the paper, I want to test some of the empirical propositions 
reviewed in earlier sections as well as some of the implications of the legal, 
political,  cultural and institutional developments on economic growth and apply 
them to the Korean case.  For this purpose, I have used both time series and cross 
section regression analysis. 
 
4.1 THE MODELS 
The fixed-effects time-series growth linear regressions were estimated using the 
following specification: 
 
[ 1 ] y(i,t) = a + ? *x(i,t) + u(i) + e(i,t) 
 
where y is the dependent variable (GDP per capita growth over the study 
period), i stands for the country, a is a constant, ?  is the coefficient of the 
independent variable x at time t, and u and e are the error terms. 
On the other hand, cross-section growth regressions were estimated using a 
simple ordinary least squares model based on the following specification: 
 
[ 2 ] y(i) = a + ? *x(i) + e(i) 
 
where y is average growth of GDP per capita over the 1960-95 period in country 
i, ?  is the coefficient of the independent variable x and e is the error term.  The 
control variables used in the experiments are per capita GDP in 1960 
(GDPSH460), to account for convergence, and average years of education 
(SCHOOL60) in 1960 to account for the human capital effect. 
 
 
Francisco Garcia-Blanch 23 Korean Economic Growth 
4.2 THE DATA  
In the time series experiment, I used data from the Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI) and International Country Risk Guide (IRCG) data sets.  
These data are available for 80 countries over a 16-year period (1980-1995), 
although many countries do not have data for the first five years (1980-84) thus 
slightly limiting the possibilities of the experiment.  The variables are the 
following: Law and order (IRCG), Bureaucratic delay (BERI), Contract 
enforcement (BERI), Quality of the bureaucracy (IRCG), and Corruption (IRCG).  
Higher values correspond to better law and order systems, less bureaucratic 
delay, better contract enforcement, better quality of the bureaucracy and less 
corruption.  The dependent variable (per capita GDP growth) comes from the 
2000 World Development Indicators CD-ROM data set, and the control variables, 
GDP per capita in 1960 and average years of education in 1960 come directly 
from the Barro-Lee data set (see appendix for more details). 
In the cross-country growth regressions, I have also made use of some data from 
the Barro-Lee data set in particular for the average years of education and the 
average GDP per capita growth.  The political variables come from two different 
data Sets.  The first inputs come from the Levine-Loayza-Beck Data Set31.  In 
particular, I have used: the business regulation index, the index of bureaucratic 
efficiency, the index of state-owned enterprises, revolutions and coups, 
assassinations, an index of civil liberties, ethnic fractionalization, the property 
rights index, the risk of expropriation, the level of legal enforcement, the general 
rule of law, the different legal origins, and a couple of geographical variables 
indicating distance from the equator and location (see appendix 2 for 
definitions). 
The second set in the governance and institutional analysis comes from the 
Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset (World Bank).  Originally, this 
                                                                 
31 This dataset is available for downloading at the Economic Growth Research Group Webpage of the 
World Bank (see appendix for details on how to obtain the data). 
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database offered a cross-section of 173 countries.  The data used to create these 
indicators is mostly for 1997-98 and I have adjusted it into continuous variable 
indexes ranging from 0 to 5.  These indicators measure the following: quality of 
regulation, accountability and voice, government effectiveness,  political 
instability and violence, lack of corruption, and rule of law.  More details on the 
number of countries used in each experiment are included in the regression 
tables and also in appendix 2. 
 
4.3 RESULTS 
The results of the fixed-effects time-series growth regressions32 are quite 
interesting.  Table 8 gathers the initial results without any control variables. 
 
Table 8. Fixed-effects by year time-series growth regression without control 
variables 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       398 
Group variable (i) : year                       Number of groups   =        11 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0421                         Obs per group: min =        35 
       between = 0.1705                                        avg =      36.2 
       overall = 0.0329                                        max =        37 
 
                                                F(5,382)           =      3.36 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1623                        Prob > F           =    0.0055 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    gdppcgrw |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    laworder |  -.4857532   .2172537    -2.24   0.026    -.9129159   -.0585904 
       delay |   .8533562   .9140106     0.93   0.351    -.9437655    2.650478 
     enforce |   .8340182   .8192364     1.02   0.309    -.7767591    2.444795 
     corrupt |   -.650918   .2962139    -2.20   0.029    -1.233332   -.0685043 
    bureaucq |   .4703987   .2873953     1.64   0.103    -.0946761    1.035473 
       _cons |   .8406037   .8677997     0.97   0.333    -.8656584    2.546866 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .82886495 
     sigma_e |  4.4679188 
         rho |   .0332707   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(10, 382) =     1.16             Prob > F = 0.3163 
 
                                                                 
32  The exact instructions in Stata that resulted in this outcomes are the following: 
xtreg gdppcgrw laworder delay enforce corrupt bureaucq, fe i (year) 
xtreg gdppcgrw  gdppc60 yreduc60 laworder delay enforce corrupt bureaucq, fe i (codenr) 
xtreg gdppcgrw  gdppc60 yreduc60 laworder delay enforce corrupt bureaucq, fe i (year) 
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Although the former experiment lacks control variables and thus some empirical 
validity, this regression is particularly interesting because it reveals the impact of 
law and order, corruption, and bureaucratic quality on growth.  The introduction 
of the control variables in the next regression analysis (table 9) only accentuates 
the trends observed in table 8.  Law and order, corruption and the quality of the 
bureaucracy appear to be significant variables that affect growth through time.  
The most intriguing outcome from the analysis is the fact that law and order is 
significantly but negatively correlated with growth while contract enforcement is 
positively but insignificantly correlated with growth.  The cross-country growth 
regressions give some more insight into this intriguing issue. 
 
Table 9. Fixed-effects by year time-series growth regression with control 
variables 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       382 
Group variable (i) : year                       Number of groups   =        11 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0703                         Obs per group: min =        34 
       between = 0.2566                                        avg =      34.7 
       overall = 0.0590                                        max =        36 
 
                                                F(7,364)           =      3.93 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1172                        Prob > F           =    0.0004 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    gdppcgrw |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdppc60 |  -.0004842   .0002142    -2.26   0.024    -.0009053    -.000063 
    yreduc60 |   .4538356   .1702216     2.67   0.008     .1190945    .7885767 
    laworder |  -.4053431   .2211037    -1.83   0.068    -.8401441    .0294578 
       delay |   1.191733    .934787     1.27   0.203    -.6465282    3.029994 
     enforce |    .051297   .8700147     0.06   0.953    -1.659589    1.762183 
     corrupt |  -.8319317   .2987712    -2.78   0.006    -1.419466   -.2443973 
    bureaucq |   .6526269   .2954073     2.21   0.028     .0717078    1.233546 
       _cons |   1.173893   .8873858     1.32   0.187     -.571153     2.91894 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .90886683 
     sigma_e |  4.3935921 
         rho |  .04103585   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(10, 364) =     1.40             Prob > F = 0.1793 
 
The results obtained when analyzing the country fixed-effects time series 
regression provide additional ideas how to approach the significance of these 
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variables on growth.  This analysis necessarily drops the control variables 
because the level of education of 1960 and the GDP per capita in 1960 are 
constant for the each country across the time series. 
Again, corruption is significantly and negatively correlated with growth, 
implying that this result is consistent with the previous finding.  Another 
important but shocking result is that both law and order and enforcement have 
now a positive and significant effect on growth.  This result is more interesting 
than the previous one because it is more significant to make a prediction across 
countries than it is to make a prediction across years.  In fact, this result is fully 
consistent with the cross-country regression analysis identifying key variables in 
the legal system (see tables 11 and 12). 
Another important point is that bureaucratic delay is not significant in either 
regression, resting weight to the hypothesis that slower bureaucratic apparatuses 
have an impact (either positive or negative) on overall economic growth, 
although more empirical work is necessary to come to a conclusion on this issue.   
 
Table 10. Fixed-effects by country time-series growth regression (no control 
variables) 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       382 
Group variable (i) : codenr                     Number of groups   =        39 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0480                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0001                                        avg =       9.8 
       overall = 0.0031                                        max =        11 
 
                                                F(5,338)           =      3.41 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6875                        Prob > F           =    0.0051 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    gdppcgrw |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdppc60 |  (dropped) 
    yreduc60 |  (dropped) 
    laworder |   .8224569   .3183807     2.58   0.010     .1961998    1.448714 
       delay |  -.8171202    2.16905    -0.38   0.707    -5.083657    3.449416 
     enforce |   5.120166    1.73132     2.96   0.003     1.714647    8.525685 
     corrupt |  -.9997963   .4198266    -2.38   0.018    -1.825598   -.1739943 
    bureaucq |  -.1439712   .6038764    -0.24   0.812      -1.3318    1.043858 
       _cons |  -7.794266   5.578405    -1.40   0.163    -18.76703    3.178497 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.6480727 
     sigma_e |  3.8675079 
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         rho |   .4708275   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(38, 338) =     3.94             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Cross-section growth regression analysis is clearly another important important 
piece of evidence in the economic development puzzle.  All four aspects of the 
legal system analyzed in table 11 are very significantly and positively correlated 
with growth.  The weight in the regression of expropriation risk (EXPRISK) and 
property rights (F_PROP97), two correlated but different variables, is higher than 
the general rule of law (RULELAW) or merely contract enforcement (ENFORCE). 
As pointed out in the legal analysis, property rights were already defined in the 
Civil Code of 1958 and the expropriation risk was fairly low for most of the 
development period, except in the early days of the Park regime.  The other 
variables in the analysis, namely contract enforcement and general rule of law, 
did not receive as much emphasis as property rights in the Korean legal system.  
Notice as well that general rule of law has less weight in the equation that the 
other legal variables analyzed.  It seems reasonable that the general rule of law 
has less weight than other legislation that is specifically designed to promote the 
basic institutions of capitalism.  For example, one of the darkest chapters of the 
Korean legal system, workers’ rights, is part of the general rule of law, but it 
would not show on the property rights regression. 
 
Table 11. Cross-section growth linear regression on the impact of the legal 
system 
growth OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
R 0.2332 0.3223 0.4597 0.6332 0.6588 
Nr. Obs 70 66 41 41 41 
school60 .5654803*** .3946867*** .1835172* .1208037 .096978 
gdpsh460 -.0005022*** -.0006381*** -.0008554*** -.0008885*** -.0007961*** 
f_prop97  .8456423***    
rulelaw     .4522872***   
enforce    .6848681***  
exprisk     .8660617*** 
Constant .7716475** -1.357275* .8638321* -.6008158 -2.792267*** 
Note: *** significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level; * significant at the 
90% level. 
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Another key but widely ignored issue is the impact of the legal origin on 
economic growth.  Arguably, some legal systems tend to promote economic 
growth better than others.  This hypothesis is, however, hard to prove.  There are 
basically four major legal systems across the world: the English (ENGLISHN) 
legal system (also known as Common Law), the Scandinavian legal system 
(SCANDN), the French legal system (FRENCHN) and the German legal system 
(FRENCHN).  Most countries in the world have constructed their legal system 
based on one of these.  Colonial heritage has been perhaps the most natural 
mechanism of transmission of the legal system, but not the only one.  For 
example, the Japanese decided conciously to adapt the German legal system 
during the years following the Meiji restoration after 1868.  Meanwhile, South 
Korea inherited its legal tradition from the Japanese during the colonial rule, so 
its legal system belongs to the German family.  The results of these regressions 
are quite surpring.  While the English and Scandinavian system have positive but 
insignificant effects on growth, the French legal system has a negative and 
significant at 84% level influence on growth.  Yet, the German legal tradition is 
significant and positive at the 98% level and boasts a beta coefficient three times 
the size of the French legal system!  Furthermore, the interest of this variable is 
great because it is completely exogenous.  Yet the validity of these results is 
limited by the sample size (seventy countries) and by the fact that only five 
coutries in the sample have a German legal tradition (Germany, Switzerland, 
Austria, Japan and Korea).  The French and the English system are, on the other 
side, much more widely spread particularly in developing countries. 
 
Table 12. Cross-section growth linear regression on the impact of the origin of 
the legal system 
growth OLS OLS OLS OLS 
R 0.2332 0.2557 0.2984 0.2340 
Nr. Obs 70 70 70 70 
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school60 .5653174*** .5314455*** .5583997*** .5613532*** 
gdpsh460 -.000502*** -.0004996*** -.0005478*** -.0005086*** 
englishn .0043578    
frenchn  -.5593035   
germann   1.801339**  
scandn    .2113463 
Constant .7699357** 1.153213*** .7750121** .7871067** 
 
The business-government relationship in South Korea has been studied by 
numerous scholars (see, for example, Kim EM, 1996).  However, the link between 
the conglomerates and the state and economic growth is much more complicated 
to estimate empirically.  Clearly, a good and clear regulatory system (F_REGU97) 
should have a positive (and in this case significant) effect on economic growth as 
reflected in table 13.  Yet, monopolistic/oligopolistic behaviour and industrial 
protection, two well-observed trends in the Korean manufacturing sector, may 
not necessarily have a negative impact on economic growth.  The index of state-
owned enterprises (SOE), a group of companies that probably enjoys both trends 
throughout the world, has a negative but insignificant (and very small) effect on 
growth.  Thus, it is harder to come to any conclusion in this regard. 
 
Table 13. Cross-section growth linear regression on the impact on business-
government interaction 
DV: growth OLS OLS OLS OLS 
R-squared 0.2621 0.1967 0.2362 0.2108 
Nr. Obs 66 37 66 37 
gdpsh460 -.0005144*** -.0005159** -.0005383*** -.0005087** 
school60 .4155587*** .2694852 .5901572*** .2243547 
f_regu97 .7919269***   .1728506 
bureau  .0249569  .0038491 
soe   -.0801455 .0722966 
cons -.9262292 2.469912** 1.200446** 1.943735 
 
The impact of governance indicators in the following cross-section (table 14) is 
less than evident.  However, these results may be biased because the growth 
variable has been averaged over a 35 year period while these governance 
indicators were specifically gathered for 1997-98. 
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Table 14. Cross-section growth linear regression on the impact of governance 
Dep. Var: growth OLS 
R-squared      0.2633 
Number of obs 68 
gdpsh460 -.0004675 
school60 .5649863 
accounta -.4115057 
stabilit .6511924 
governme -.636148 
nocorrup .3033737 
_cons .649679 
 
Contrary to the results presented by Sala-i-Marti (1998), the average degree of 
etholinguistic fractionalization (AVELF) comes out to be very significant.  The 
implications for the Korean case are straightforward.  Korea’s index is one of the 
lowest in the world because of the complete homogeneity of the Han population 
and the country wide usage of the Korean language and alphabet.  Little 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization does not only imply a lower degree of domestic 
political conflict but also high degrees of nationalism and national identity may 
also be related to this variable.  Table 15 also includes the impact of the different 
religious affiliations on growth although it is harder to reach a conclusion á la 
Max Weber from these figures.  An important note is that all religions have 
negative impacts on growth, while the only religious variable significant at the 
10% level is Catholicism (CATHO80).  The Protestant variable (PROTMG80) is 
significant at the 85% level, while the Muslim variable (MUSLIM80) is 
insignificant. 
 
Table 15. Cross-section growth linear regression on the impact of culture 
Number of obs 70 
R-squared 0.3606 
gdpsh460 -.0004623*** 
school60 .4467206*** 
protmg80 -.0146454 
catho80 -.0113763* 
muslim80 -.0088977 
Avelf -2.342521*** 
_cons 2.689406*** 
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The impact of different political variables on growth is also hard to grasp.  It 
seems that civil liberties (CIVIL) and the number of revolutions (REVC) are 
negatively and significantly correlated with growth, although violence measured 
in terms of assassinations (ASSASS) is not that significant.  The regression 
suggests that a stable regime with limited civil liberties may be growth 
enhancing, although the coefficient of political instability measured as the 
average number of revolutions and coups per year33 has a much more negative 
impact on growth than civil liberties.  This statement has to be made with great 
care, since limited civil liberties increase significantly the risk of political abuse 
and corruption, and this may end up creating greater political instability.  Korea 
has actually enjoyed this sort of political regime with one peculiar characteristic: 
strong property rights and a fairly good legal system.  And these variables may 
actually have the effect of offsetting to some extent corruption and political 
abuse. 
 
Table 16. Cross-section growth linear regression on political violence and civil 
rights 
growth OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Number of obs 70 70 69 69 
R-squared 0.2394 0.2634 0.4154 0.4213 
gdpsh460 -.0004996*** -.0005533*** -.0006145*** -.0006192*** 
school60 .558211*** .5512402*** .3568545*** .3575917*** 
assass -.2963571   -.12649 
revc  -1.482041*  -.4439608 
civil   -.548207*** -.5215685*** 
_cons .8714323** 1.197505*** 3.471901*** 3.505723*** 
 
Finally, it is important to remember the geographical location of the South 
Korean peninsula.  Other than being placed in a key geostrategic position sharing 
borders with China, Japan, and Russia, and being home to 30.000 American 
troops, Korea is located quite far from the tropic and, as table 17 shows this has a 
                                                                 
33 This indicator averages over the 1960-90 period illegal or forced change in the top governmental 
elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim 
is independence from central government. 
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positive and significant effect on growth (LAT_ABST).  As mentioned before, 
being far from the equator line has other beneficial effects such as lower rates of 
disease and a greater incentive to “produce for the winter time.” 
 
Table 17. Cross-section growth linear regression on the impact of geography 
Growth OLS OLS OLS 
Number of obs 70 70 70 
R-squared      0.3529 0.2886 0.3761 
gdpsh460   -.0006999*** -.0005307*** -.0006904*** 
school60 .4504618*** .5767123*** .471218*** 
lat_abst 4.411593***  3.921571*** 
latam  -.7320891* -.4193055 
asianics  .871031 .7483488 
Constant .3528903 .9634797** .4800899 
 
5. KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM A GROWTH 
ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVE 
5.1 ESTIMATING TECHNICAL CHANGE 
The final part of this paper is devoted to estimating different measures of 
productivity of Korean economy.  The growth accounting exercise in this section 
relies on a series of strong assumptions. Thus, the following has to hold: 
1. Constant returns to scale (the production function is homogeneous of 
degree 1). 
2. Perfect competition. 
3. Capital and labour are the only factors of production. 
4. Marginal product of capital is equal to r, and marginal product of 
labour is equal to w. 
5. All sectors have identical production functions. 
6. Technical change is Hicks-neutral (Y = f(K, L, A) or alternatively  
Y = A f(L, K)) 
 
The departure function is: 
[ 3 ] Y = f(K, L, A), 
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where Y is output, K is capital, L is labor and A is technical change.  The 
accounting identity is then 
[ 4 ] Y = wL + rK 
where w is an adjusted measure of wage or the marginal productivity of labor 
and r the return on capital or the marginal productivity of capital.  From this 
accounting identity, we can estimate the return on capital: 
[ 5 ] 
K
wLY
r
?
?  
Going back to our initial production function and our assumptions number 1 and 
6, we find that the function can be transformed into 
[ 6 ] log Y = log A + log f 
and if we derive with respect to time, we have that 
[ 7 ] 
f
t
f
A
t
A
Y
t
Y
?
?
??
?
??
? logloglog
 
The fundamental equation of neoclassical growth is defined as: 
[ 8 ] 
L
dt
dL
f
wL
k
dt
dk
f
rk
A
dt
dA
Y
dt
dY
???  
where ??
f
rk  and ??
f
wL .  This equation states that the growth rate of Y is 
equal to the growth rates of technical change, capital and labour, accounting for 
the relative income share of the two inputs and teAA ?0? .  Also,  
[ 9 ] 
w
w
r
r
L
L
K
K
??
??
?
?
??  
The literature in general tries to get around the estimation of the Solow residual 
by considering gross rather than net output measures.  Another way to avoid the 
inherent bias is to estimate productivity growth rates at the industry level instead 
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of at the aggregate economy level.  Table 18 gathers different productivity 
estimates of the manufacturing sector in South Korea. 
 
Table 18. Estimates of Total Factor Productivity Growth in Korean 
Manufacturing industry (based on net value added) 
Authors Periods TFP Value 
Added 
TFP/Value 
Added 
Sources 
C. Kim and Shon (1979) 1966-75 2.6 25.5 10.2 RMMS 
Kim C.K. (1979) 1966-75 2.6 25.5 10.2 RMMS 
Kim, Yoo and Hwang (1984) 1967-79 5.5 23.6 23.3 RMMS 
Kim and Park (1988) 1966-83 7.0 19.5 36.0 RMMS 
S.S. Lee (1988) 1966-83 
1973-83 
6.15 
2.0 
18.9 
13.6 
32.4 
15.2 
RMMS 
Cho (1991) 1971-90 2.1 13.2 15.4 NA 
Moon, Cho, Whang and 
Kim (1991) 
1971-89 3.6 12.8 27.6 NA 
Pyo, Kong, Kown, and Kim 
(1993) 
1970-90 1.1 8.4 8.4 NA 
Pilat (1995) 1967-87 4.3   RMMS 
Young (1995) 1966-90 3.0 14.1 21.3 NA 
Pyo, H (1995) 1970-92 1.1 12.2 8.9 NA 
Kwack S.Y.(1999) 1971-93 3.2 14.2 22.7 NA 
Source: this table is borrowed from Kwack (1999). 
Notes: NA: National Accounts,  RMMS: Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey 
 
The following estimates (table 19) are also based on the National Accounts, while 
the capital stock has been constructed using the perpetual inventory method.  
The average technical change per year for the whole economy is estimated at 
1.315, while the absolute rate of technical change is much smaller at 1.025. This 
residual is quite small for the reference period (1970-2000) and thus supports the 
hypothesis of little technical change.  From these figures, it seems that capital 
deepening is a crucial piece of the South Korean economic puzzle while technical 
change does not appear to be a major source of growth.   
.   
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Table 
19 Y K K/Y W L/Y L w Beta Alpha 
Technical 
Change 
(%) r  Sigma  Year 
Absolute 
rate of 
technical 
change 
Average 
technical 
change 
growth 
1970 56209 70939.993  1.262     28,854.0     0.513  9,618 3.00 0.51 0.49       0.39    0 1   
1971 61024.9 76639.394  1.256     30,845.5     0.505  9,946 3.10 0.51 0.49 2.91    0.39      3.681  1 1.03 2.907 
1972 64000.9 82162.924  1.284     32,026.0     0.500  10,379 3.09 0.50 0.50 -0.89    0.39      4.267  2 1.02 1.010 
1973 71898.1 90004.178  1.252     33,113.3     0.461  10,942 3.03 0.46 0.54 4.86    0.43      0.325  3 1.04 1.323 
1974 77212 99222.269  1.285     35,615.4     0.461  11,421 3.12 0.46 0.54 -0.15    0.42      1.018  4 1.05 1.177 
1975 82257.5 109036.16  1.326     37,169.9     0.452  11,691 3.18 0.45 0.55 0.12    0.41      2.268  5 1.00 -0.007 
1976 91467.7 121461.55  1.328     43,074.7     0.471  12,412 3.47 0.47 0.53 2.16    0.40      0.408  6 1.02 0.380 
1977 100621.6 138383.57  1.375     49,833.6     0.495  12,812 3.89 0.50 0.50 1.12    0.37      0.536  7 1.03 0.469 
1978 109687.4 162360.59  1.480     57,179.5     0.521  13,412 4.26 0.52 0.48 -2.05    0.32      0.588  8 0.99 -0.117 
1979 117434.7 188134.76  1.602     62,898.9     0.536  13,602 4.62 0.54 0.46 -1.27    0.29      0.768  9 0.97 -0.370 
1980 114977.7 208989.82  1.818     61,199.9     0.532  13,683 4.47 0.53 0.47 -7.56    0.26      1.319  10 0.92 -0.883 
1981 122412.2 227681.93  1.860     63,980.9     0.523  14,023 4.56 0.52 0.48 0.96    0.26      2.837  11 0.94 -0.600 
1982 131285.8 248675.74  1.894     70,891.0     0.540  14,379 4.93 0.54 0.46 1.52    0.24      0.498  12 1.03 0.207 
1983 145330.6 274232.95  1.887     74,889.9     0.515  14,505 5.16 0.52 0.48 5.50    0.26      9.032  13 1.07 0.540 
1984 157318.4 302320.1  1.922     76,908.1     0.489  14,429 5.33 0.49 0.51 3.55    0.27     34.515  14 1.09 0.647 
1985 167501.9 330811.1  1.975     84,089.3     0.502  14,970 5.62 0.50 0.50 -0.18    0.25      0.536  15 1.03 0.225 
1986 185869 362549.64  1.951     89,103.0     0.479  15,505 5.75 0.48 0.52 4.39    0.27      1.697  16 1.04 0.264 
1987 206287.2 400904.66  1.943     99,692.5     0.483  16,354 6.10 0.48 0.52 2.85    0.27      0.790  17 1.08 0.426 
1988 227863.9 445029.83  1.953    113,031.0     0.496  16,869 6.70 0.50 0.50 3.25    0.26      0.610  18 1.06 0.339 
1989 241725.5 497080.74  2.056    140,532.6     0.581  17,560 8.00 0.58 0.42 -1.84    0.20      0.187  19 1.01 0.074 
1990 263430.4 565755.6  2.148    159,701.3     0.606  18,085 8.83 0.61 0.39 1.46    0.18      0.534  20 1.00 -0.019 
1991 287737.9 643438.42  2.236    175,885.8     0.611  18,677 9.42 0.61 0.39 1.84    0.17      0.884  21 1.03 0.157 
1992 303383.9 716491.9  2.362    193,441.2     0.638  19,033 10.16 0.64 0.36 -0.14    0.15      0.481  22 1.02 0.077 
1993 320044.2 792498.9  2.476    205,820.3     0.643  19,328 10.65 0.64 0.36 0.66    0.14      0.835  23 1.01 0.023 
1994 346448.1 876624.46  2.530    222,356.2     0.642  19,905 11.17 0.64 0.36 2.54    0.14      1.141  24 1.03 0.133 
1995 377349.8 971231.83  2.574    235,440.9     0.624  20,432 11.52 0.62 0.38 3.35    0.15   125.577  25 1.06 0.236 
1996 402821.2 1071250  2.659    260,552.1     0.647  20,817 12.52 0.65 0.35 1.70    0.13      0.475  26 1.05 0.194 
1997 423006.7 1162982.1  2.749    277,570.6     0.656  21,106 13.15 0.66 0.34 1.09    0.13      0.658  27 1.03 0.103 
1998 394710.4 1219396.5  3.089    247,703.0     0.628  19,994 12.39 0.63 0.37 -4.90    0.12      4.597  28 0.96 -0.136 
1999 437709.4 1277199.6  2.918    267,471.6     0.611  20,281 13.19 0.61 0.39 8.23    0.13      0.804  29 1.03 0.115 
2000 476269.3 1345222.8  2.825    299,845.6     0.630  21,061 14.24 0.63 0.37 4.39    0.13      0.155  30 1.13 0.421 
Avg. 211783.8 486410.1 1.977 123571.533 0.548 15717 7.052 0.548 0.452 1.315 0.256 6.734 15 1.025 0.310 
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Graph 1. Technical Change in South Korea 1970-2000       Graph 2. Absolute rate of technical change in South Korea 
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Graph 3. Average technical change growth in South Korea (1970-2000)        Graph 4. Sigma values for the 1970-2000 period in South Korea 
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5.2 ESTIMATING PRODUCTIVITY ENDOGENOUSLY 
The main problem with the methodology used in the previous exercise is that it left 
the accumulation of human capital out of the analysis.  Neoclassical growth theory 
initially developed by Solow (1956) stressed savings and physical capital 
accumulation as the engines of economic growth.  Thirty years later, the 
proponents of the endogenous growth theory, Romer (1990) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), argued that Solow based models could not explain empirically 
the disparities in the level and growth rates of cross-country per capita incomes 
and, from a more fundamental standpoint, they argued that the neoclassical 
growth theory failed to explain the determinants of technological advancement.  
The growth accounting method ignored the contribution of human capital to both 
technological progress and factor inputs (namely labor and capital).  Thus, it failed 
to explain where the growth came from.  An example of this is that human capital 
growth may contribute endogenously to physical capital accumulation.  As a 
matter of fact, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) demonstrated that the level of initial 
human capital stock is positively correlated with the ex-post accumulation of 
physical capital34.  The conclusion that follows is that human capital may have 
contributed significantly to the capital deepening process in South Korea.  The 
second problem derived from the growth accounting method is that the 
unexplained residual of output growth is normally attributed to Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth, otherwise called exogenous technological progress.  
The assumption of exogeneity is, however, misleading35 as some of this 
technological progress may in fact be endogenous. Thus, in this part of the paper, I 
have used a methodology based on the augmented Solow growth models initially 
proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  
 
                                                                 
34 This was proved in the context of cross-country data. 
35 See, for example, Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) for the theoretical basis of the 
endogenous theory. 
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The point of departure in this model is a homogeneous production function 
[ 10 ]  Y = F(X1, X2, X3, …., Xn,t) 
Alternatively, we can start from an exponential production function: 
[ 11 ] Y=A L? /2 K? /2 H1-?  
where Y is output, L is labor, K is the capital stock, H is the human capital stock 
and ?  is an indicator of factor weight36.  From this equation, we can reach the rate 
of TFP growth: 
[ 12 ]  ? A/A = ? Y/Y - (? /2) ? L/L - (? /2) ? K/K - (1-? ) ? H/H 
The contribution of each of the factors to growth is calculated in the following way: 
[ 13 ] 
?
?
?
?
?
?
??
L
K
CapitalPhysical  
[ 14 ] Human Capital = ? ? ??1H  
[ 15 ] 
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
1H
L
K
L
Y
TFP  
The data used in the analysis is the following:  
- Output Growth: The basic output measure is Gross Domestic Product in national 
prices of 1987. 
- Physical Capital: The measure of the capital stock is based on a perpetual 
inventory estimation with a common geometric depreciation rate. 
- Labor Inputs: The measure of the quantity of labor is actual employment for the 
industrial countries and estimates from the International Labor Organization of the 
economically-active (labor force) population for the others. 
- Human capital: It is a quality adjusted measure of the quantity of education.  The 
original figures for Korea are taken from Bosworth and Collins (1996), and in turn 
their calculation is based on the Barro-Lee data set. 
                                                                 
36 I have assumed that ? =0.65 
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Following the methodology of Bosworth and Collins (1996), I find slightly different 
estimates.  There are a couple of problems with the data used by these researchers. 
First, the initial stock of physical capital used in the calculations was taken from 
the “total physical capital” figures estimated by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) 37.  
This estimate is already taking into account the depreciation of the stock of capital.  
For this purporse, Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) use the perpetual inventory 
method38: 
[ 16 ]  Kt = It + (1-? )Kt-1 
where Kt is the stock of capital in year t, ?  is the depreciation rate (generally set at 
5%), and It is the investment for year t .  However, Bosworth and Collins (1996) 
redepreciate the stock of physical capital from the original estimates, implicitly 
decreasing the role of capital in the calculation of Total Factor Productivity 
estimates.  A second problem is that the researchers do not use the readily 
available GDP figures from Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).  The divergence 
between the World Bank data and the Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) data set may 
be primarily due to the adjustment of GDP figures to constant local currency units 
in different years.  Thus, using the GDP estimates (GDP at market prices) from the 
same data set as the total physical capital data can help to reduce a potential 
estimation error.  Again, total factor productivity growth is small and only 
accounts for about 1% of the growth.  Similarly, the growth in the stock of human 
capital stands at about 1% as well, while the capital deepening hypothesis gains 
weight by claiming 2.7% of the growth over the sample period. 
 
                                                                 
37 Nehru, Vikram, and Ashok Dhareshwar. 1993. "A New Database on Physical Capital Stock: Sources, 
Methodology and Results." Revista de Analisis Economico 8 (1): 37-59 
38 Basically, this method departs from a base capital stock.  The base capital stock is typically anywhere 
between 0.5x and 3xGDP, but in this case it is taken from the estimates of Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).  
Then, the capital stock is depreciated at a constant rate, typically between 3% and 10% depending on the type 
of capital good (a usual figure for the economy as a whole is 4%).  To this depreciated capital stock, one has 
to add the gross domestic fixed investment.  In the case of South Korea, the original capital stock as a 
percentage of GDP ranges from 0.62 in 1953 to 2.29 in 1990. 
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Table 20. Total Factor Productivity Estimates 
 Results   
 Output/worker Contribution of 
Year Y/L  ?(Y/L) Capital  ?K Education  ?Ed TFP 
TFP 
Growth 
1970 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
1971 1.050 0.050 1.015 0.015 1.015 0.015 1.018 0.018 
1972 1.055 0.005 1.025 0.009 1.031 0.015 0.999 -0.019 
1973 1.124 0.066 1.039 0.014 1.046 0.015 1.035 0.036 
1974 1.157 0.029 1.059 0.019 1.061 0.015 1.030 -0.005 
1975 1.204 0.041 1.086 0.025 1.076 0.014 1.031 0.001 
1976 1.261 0.047 1.104 0.017 1.089 0.012 1.049 0.018 
1977 1.344 0.066 1.143 0.035 1.102 0.012 1.067 0.018 
1978 1.399 0.041 1.189 0.041 1.114 0.012 1.056 -0.011 
1979 1.477 0.056 1.246 0.048 1.127 0.011 1.052 -0.004 
1980 1.438 -0.027 1.290 0.035 1.140 0.011 0.978 -0.070 
1981 1.494 0.039 1.318 0.022 1.147 0.006 0.988 0.011 
1982 1.562 0.046 1.348 0.022 1.154 0.006 1.005 0.017 
1983 1.714 0.097 1.390 0.032 1.161 0.006 1.062 0.057 
1984 1.866 0.088 1.441 0.037 1.168 0.006 1.108 0.044 
1985 1.915 0.026 1.468 0.019 1.175 0.006 1.109 0.001 
1986 2.051 0.071 1.498 0.020 1.187 0.010 1.154 0.040 
1987 2.158 0.052 1.523 0.017 1.198 0.009 1.183 0.025 
1988 2.311 0.071 1.562 0.026 1.209 0.010 1.223 0.034 
1989 2.355 0.019 1.601 0.025 1.221 0.009 1.205 -0.015 
1990 2.492 0.058 1.658 0.036 1.232 0.009 1.220 0.012 
1991 2.636 0.058 1.715 0.034 1.243 0.009 1.237 0.014 
1992 2.727 0.035 1.769 0.032 1.254 0.009 1.229 -0.006 
1993 2.833 0.039 1.823 0.030 1.265 0.009 1.229 0.000 
1994 2.978 0.051 1.869 0.025 1.276 0.009 1.248 0.016 
1995 3.160 0.061 1.920 0.027 1.288 0.009 1.279 0.024 
1996 3.311 0.048 1.974 0.028 1.299 0.009 1.292 0.010 
Average growth 0.047 = 0.027 + 0.010 + 0.010 
Note: this table breaks down the growth in production (Y) per worker into three different 
components (physical capital, human capital or education and TFP growth).  One column accounts 
for the cumulative stock of the variable while the other gathers the percentage change over the 
previous year. 
 
Graph 5 gives an idea of how important physical capital growth has been.  While 
the growth in the human capital stock could be probably defined by a linear 
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equation, the growth in physical capital stock is exponential.  It even grows very 
aggressively during the economic slowdown of the early eighties. 
 
Graph 5. Factor input growth in South Korea 1953-1990 
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Note: figures in years (right axis) and billion won (left axis). 
 
5.3 GROWTH ACCOUNTING IN THE CONTEXT OF KOREA 
Why is the capital accumulation story so appealing in the case of South Korea? If 
we look at the different factors of production over a twenty or thirty year period 
we find that capital grew very impressively in this Asian country.  For example, in 
1990 the capital stock was 31.2 times larger than the capital stock in 1961.  In 
contrast, the same growth figure in the educational index used by Bosworth and 
Collins (1996) was only 1.43, while the comparable growth in labor force was 2.31.  
In terms of schooling, the number of years of education grew by 2.926 times in the 
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1971-96 period, while the contribution to growth of human capital39 was only 
1.299. In sum, unless we use a high discount factor for the schooling quality, it 
seems clear that the increase in capital stock was by far the largest contributor to 
economic growth in the 1961-90 period.  
Looking at productivity, the estimates in table 20 indicate that the contribution of 
TFP to growth was only 1.29 compared to a contribution of capital of 3.31.  In fact, 
some authors have found significant inefficiencies in some sectors of the Korean 
economy.  For example, in a comparative study Okuda (1997) reveals significant 
inefficiencies in the Korean manufacturing sector prior to 1986.  Table 20 reflects 
that, during the heavy and chemical industry drive, TFPG was negative in four out 
of nine years. 
Another useful exercise may be to put the capital stock growth figure in 
comparative international perspective.  As a percentage of GDP, the stock of 
capital in South Korea went from 0.804 in 1961 to 2.206 in 1990.  The Japanese case 
is similar and the capital stock as a percentage of GDP went from 1.007 in 1961 to 
2.268 in 1990.  On the other hand, the same figures for the US are 1.813 for 1961 and 
2.125 for 1990, indicating that the growth of the capital stock in the US was much 
smaller during that period40.  Ueda (2000) uses a stochastic growth model to 
determine optimal investment behavior and suggests that market forces do not 
explain the rise in investment rates in the 1960s and 1970s.  This is consistent with 
the capital accumulation hypothesis of Korean economic growth.  As I have 
shown, the growth of the capital stock is spectacular.  Yoon (1999) explains that, as 
fixed set up costs increase, the number of active entrepreneurs decreases while 
risk-neutral entrepreneurs tend to adopt riskier technologies, thus increasing 
                                                                 
39 Some important factors have been, however, omited from the human capital estimates of Bosworth and 
Collins.  For example, the role of multinational enterprises has been very relevant in the development of 
South Korea’s electronic industry (Cyhn, 2000).  Korean companies have participated and learned through 
inter-firm agreements with multinational corporations called Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) 
arrangement.  This is obviously not register in the human capital development index, but the question 
remains: where is it? 
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volatility in total output growth.  A similar argument may be made for the 
financing of entrepreneurial ventures in South Korea, although the moral hazard 
introduced by the government when bailing out conglomerates has probably 
contributed to intensify this trend.  Under severe moral hazard induced by bailout 
policies and no competition law in line with industrial policies, Korean 
entrepreneurs may have opted to over invest in fixed capital formation and to 
leave most of the human capital formation to the state and to individual families. 
Lee JM (1997) suggests that Korean infant industries have tended to mature while 
under protection, and also shows that output grew faster in infant than in mature 
industries, thus supporting the revisionist arguments that enhance the role of 
government intervention.  On the other hand, Lee JW (1995) investigates the 
impact of industrial policy in South Korea and concludes that trade protection 
reduced both the growth rates of labor productivity and total factor productivity 
over the 1963-83 period, thus having a negative impact on growth. 
However, according to Hahn (1999), low unemployment in Korea is closely linked 
with high labor productivity over the past two decades.  The key factors 
supporting this inverse relationship are capital accumulation, better education, and 
high aggregate demand.  Hahn further claims that half of the labor productivity 
growth is actually attributed to an increase in the capital stock.  Meanwhile, 
Mamgain (1999) finds that high rates of growth of manufacturing translate into 
high productivity rates in Korea.   
Lee, Kim and Heo (1998) argue that productivity growth has been dominated by 
technological change rather than by technical efficiency change, and this may 
account for the low TFPG figures found by several studies (including this one).  On 
the other hand, Drysdale and Huang (1997) find that productivity improvement 
was a key element of East Asia growth using model based on purchasing power 
parity adjusted inputs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
40 These calculations are based, for the Korean case, on the same datasets used in the calculation of the TPF 
figures.  The Japanese and US estimations are based on rough data provided by Prof. Ryuzo Sato of New 
York University. 
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To close the discussion, it is important to note that the agricultural sector may have 
pushed the productivity calculations down for the whole economy.  Contrary to 
the conventional view, Ramachandran (1996) compellingly argues that most of the 
growth in the agricultural sector in South Korea took place in the pre-war period, 
way before industrialization started.  According to this author, agricultural 
development preceded industrial development.  This is consistent with my own 
preliminary calculations of agricultural productivity that indicate little growth in 
output during the last thirty years, although can not explain the large increase in 
agricultural machinery investment over the 1970-2000 period. 
In sum, I conclude that human capital and labor productivity have contributed 
much less to growth than physical capital in the Korean case, and that the total 
factor productivity increases have been, at most, moderate over the development 
period. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the different sources and hypothesis on South Korean 
economic growth.  I have also estimated empirically both the explanatory variables 
of growth and the impact of physical and human capital and productivity 
increases on economic growth. 
In the first empirical exercise, I have shown that the legal, political, cultural and 
institutional analysis of economic growth brings about several important 
conclusions that specifically apply to the Korean case.  In the first place, that the 
early protection of property rights and, to a lesser extent, contract enforcement, 
was extremely important in achieving ex-post growth.  Secondly, Korea has 
benefited from having a very succesful legal tradition from an economic 
perspective: the German legal system.  In the third place, political stability has also 
been crucial over the development period.  Fourth, the uniform composition in 
terms of race and language has also favored Korea. 
South Korean Economic Growth 45 Francisco G. Blanch 
In the second empirical exercise, I have estimated factor productivity growth using 
the Solow growth model as well as an endogenous growth model.  In both cases, 
total factor productivity growth estimates are moderate.  Moreover, the role of 
capital accumulation is extremely important in both cases while in the second case 
the growth in human capital is moderate.  A criticism is that the human capital 
stock measure of Bosworth and Collins is only a measure of the years and the 
quality of formal education.  Thus, it is not capturing additional educational 
externalities derived from the technology transfer and training agreements that 
Korean companies may have had with multinational corporations41. 
Korea is, in sum, not only one of the most successful economic growth stories of 
the past century but also one of the most intriguing ones.  After taking a close look 
at the political economy of South Korean development is hard to accept the 
neoclassical view, although I do admit some of its arguments.  I find, however, the 
revisionist theses quite plausible and in fact quite compatible with the capital 
accumulation story of Young because, as every economist knows, an insured 
investor tends to take excessive risks and to over-invest.  Government-controlled 
credit markets together with government-sponsored corporate bailouts induced a 
great deal of moral hazard in the system, thus converting the Korean economy into 
some sort of “real option,” a lot to win and little to loose.  Korean entrepreneurs 
have been, in a way, insured and spoiled capitalists that have benefited from a 
unique political, institutional, legal and cultural climate.  After all, “in human life, 
economics precedes politics or culture.” 
 
                                                                 
41 See Amsden (1989) for a full explanation of how Korean engineers learned from multinational corporations 
on site. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
ADDITIONAL GRAPHS 
 
Graph 6. Behaviour of the Korean won and the Japanese yen against the dollar. 
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Source: Bank of Japan and South Korean National Statistical Office 
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APPENDIX 2 
SOURCES OF DATA FOR THE GROWTH REGRESSIONS 
 
A. Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset, World Bank 
 
Characteristics of the data set: Cross-section of 173 countries.  The data used to 
create these indicators is mostly for 1997-98.  Continuous variable indexes ranging 
from 0 to 5. 
 
Quality of Regulation: measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies and 
perception of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation  
 
Accountability and Voice: measures the extent to which citizens of a country are 
able to participate in the selection of governments. 
 
Government Effectiveness: perceptions on the quality of public service provision, 
the quality of the bureaucracy and the competence of civil servants. 
 
Political Instability and Violence: measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in the power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly 
unconstitutional and/or violent means 
 
No Corruption: measures perceptions on the lack of corruption. 
 
Rule of Law: measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society. 
 
B. Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) and International Country Risk 
Guide (IRCG) datasets. 
 
Characteristics of the datasets: a time series of 80 countries for 16 years (1980-1995), 
although many countries do not have data for the first five years (1980-84) for 
several variables. 
 
Law and order (IRCG): An index of the quality of law enforcement.  It is a discrete 
index ranging from 0 to 6. 
 
Bureaucratic delay (BERI): Continuous index ranging from 0 to 4. 
 
Contract enforcement (BERI): Continuous index ranging from 0 to 4. 
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Quality of the bureaucracy (IRCG): Discrete index ranging from 0 to 6. 
 
Corruption (IRCG): Discrete index ranging from 0 to 6. 
 
C. Freedom House Dataset 
Characteristics:  Available on-line www.worldaudit.org. As opposed to previous 
datasets, lower scores mean more liberties/rights etc. 
 
Civil Liberties: Discrete index ranging 1 through 7 
 
Political Rights: Discrete index ranging 1 through 7 
 
Press Freedom: Continuous index ranging 1 through 100  
 
Corruption: Continuous index ranging 1 through 100 
 
D. Polity IV Project 
 
Several datasets that include indicators of democracy and autocracy, authority 
characteristics, and regime transitions. 
 
E. The 2000 World Development Indicators CD-ROM  
This CD-ROM contains over 500 social and economic indicators for all countries 
from 1960 through 1998. 
F. Levine-Loayza-Beck Data Set (World Bank Group on Economic Growth) 
This data set is available for download at the World Bank Research group on 
economic growth webpage (www.worldbank.org/research/growth).  The 
variables I have included in the analysis are the following: 
- Revolutions and Coups A revolution is defined as any illegal or forced change in 
the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or 
unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from central 
government. Coup d’Etat is defined as an extraconstitutional or forced change in 
the top government elite and/or its effective control of the nation’s power 
structure in a given year. Unsuccessful coups are not counted. Data are averaged 
over 1960-90 
- Assassinations: Number of assassinations per thousand inhabitants. Data are 
averaged over 1960-90. 
- Ethnic fractionalization: Average value of five indices of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, with values ranging from0 to 1, where higher values denote 
higher levels of fractionalization. 
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- Bureaucratic efficiency: Average of three indices published by Business 
International Corporation (1984): efficiency of the judiciary system, red tape and 
corruption. The data are averages over the period 1980-83. 
- Property rights: Rating of property rights on a scale from 1 to 5. The more 
protection private property receives, the higher the score. 
- Cost of business regulation: Rating of regulation policies related to opening and 
keeping open a business. The scale is from 0 to 5, with higher scores meaning that 
regulations are straightforward and applied uniformly to all businesses and that 
regulations are less of a burden to business. 
- Risk of expropriation: Assessment of risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced 
nationalization”. It ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores indicating a higher risk 
and data are averaged over 1982-1995. 
- Religious Composition: Percentage of the population that were (1) Roman 
Catholic, (2) Protestant, and (3) Muslim in 1980. 
 
 
Table 21. Countries Used in Time Series Regressions 
 
1.Argentina 21.Egypt, Arab Rep. 41.Kenya 61.Senegal 
2.Australia 22.El Salvador 42.Korea, Republic 62.Seychelles 
3.Austria 23.Ethiopia 43.Malaysia 63.Singapore 
4.Bahrain 24.Finland 44.Mali 64.South Africa 
5.Belgium 25.France 45.Mauritan 65.Sri Lanka 
6.Belize 26.Gabon 46.Mexico 66.Swaziland 
7.Benin 27.Germany 47.Moldova 67.Sweden 
8.Bolivia 28.Greece 48.Nepal 68.Switzerland 
9.Brazil 29.Guatemala 49.Netherlands 69.Syrian Arab R. 
10.Burundi 30.Guyana 50.New Zealand 70.Tanzania 
11.Canada 31.Haiti 51.Niger 71.Thailand 
12.Chile 32.Honduras 52.Nigeria 72.Togo 
13.Colombia 33.India 53.Norway 73.Turkey 
14.Congo, D (Zaire) 34.Indonesia 54.Panama 74.Uganda 
15.Congo, R 35.Ireland 55.PapuaN.Guinea 75.United Kingd. 
16.Cote d'Ivoire 36.Israel 56.Paraguay 76.United States 
17.Cyprus 37.Italy 57.Peru 77.Uruguay 
18.Denmark 38.Jamaica 58.Philippiness 78.Venezuela 
19.Dominican Rep. 39.Japan 59.Portugal 79.Zambia 
20.Ecuador 40.Jordan 60.Saudi Arabia 80.Zimbabwe 
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Table 22. Correlations between independent variables used in the time series 
regressions  and growth 
 
             | gdppcgrw  gdppc60 yreduc60 laworder    delay  enforce  corrupt bureaucq 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    gdppcgrw |   1.0000 
     gdppc60 |  -0.0060   1.0000 
    yreduc60 |   0.0871   0.8263   1.0000 
    laworder |  -0.0671   0.2804   0.1496   1.0000 
       delay |   0.0548   0.1811   0.1851   0.5803   1.0000 
     enforce |   0.0578   0.2836   0.3245   0.5828   0.8927   1.0000 
     corrupt |  -0.0602   0.2712   0.2197   0.6728   0.7447   0.7188   1.0000 
    bureaucq |   0.0310   0.3668   0.2738   0.6673   0.7323   0.7443   0.7868   1.0000 
 
 
Table 23. Countries Used in Cross-Section Regressions 
 
1.Argentina 25.Guyana 48.Panama 
2.Australia 26.Haiti 49.Papua New Guinea 
3.Austria 27.Honduras 50.Paraguay 
4.Bangladesh 28.Iceland 51.Peru 
5.Barbados 29.India 52.Philippines 
6.Belgium 30.Ireland 53.Portugal 
7.Bolivia 31.Israel 54.Senegal 
8.Brazil 32.Italy 55.Sierra Leone 
9.Canada 33.Jamaica 56.South Africa 
10.Chile 34.Japan 57.Spain 
11.Colombia 35.Kenya 58.Sri Lanka 
12.Costa Rica 36.Korea, Rep. 59.Sweden 
13.Cyprus 37.Liberia 60.Switzerland 
14.Denmark 38.Malaysia 61.Syrian Arab Rep. 
15.Dominican Republic 39.Malta 62.Thailand 
16.Ecuador 40.Mauritius 63.Togo 
17.El Salvador 41.Mexico 64.Trinidad and Tobago 
18.Fiji 42.Nepal 65.United Kingdom 
19.Finland 43.Netherlands 66.United States 
20.France 44.New Zealand 67.Uruguay 
21.Germany 45.Niger 68.Venezuela 
22.Ghana 46.Norway 69.Zaire 
23.Greece 47.Pakistan 70.Zimbabwe 
24.Guatemala   
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Table 24. Correlations between legal variables in the cross-country growth 
regressions 
  
             |   growth school60 gdpsh460 f_prop97  rulelaw  enforce  exprisk 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth |   1.0000 
    school60 |  -0.0546   1.0000 
    gdpsh460 |  -0.3088   0.7984   1.0000 
    f_prop97 |   0.3854   0.7037   0.5676   1.0000 
     rulelaw |   0.1582   0.6963   0.7695   0.7479   1.0000 
     enforce |   0.2380   0.7122   0.7581   0.7685   0.9819   1.0000 
     exprisk |   0.3181   0.6859   0.6972   0.7231   0.9079   0.9562   1.0000 
    englishn |  -0.0130   0.0047  -0.1207  -0.0636  -0.1817  -0.1845  -0.1315 
     frenchn |  -0.2566  -0.2995  -0.1557  -0.3266  -0.2032  -0.2415  -0.2628 
     germann |   0.3607   0.1016   0.1280   0.3722   0.2333   0.3010   0.3076 
      scandn |   0.0423   0.3695   0.3080   0.2257   0.3678   0.3602   0.3021 
 
             | englishn  frenchn  germann   scandn 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
    englishn |   1.0000 
     frenchn |  -0.6325   1.0000 
     germann |  -0.2928  -0.3086   1.0000 
      scandn |  -0.2582  -0.2722  -0.1260   1.0000 
 
 
 
Table 25. Correlations between cultural and religious variables in the cross-country 
growth regressions 
 
             |   growth gdpsh460 school60 protmg80  catho80 muslim80    avelf 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth |   1.0000 
    gdpsh460 |   0.1269   1.0000 
    school60 |   0.3719   0.8178   1.0000 
    protmg80 |  -0.0103   0.5116   0.4447   1.0000 
     catho80 |  -0.0483  -0.0015  -0.0404  -0.3994   1.0000 
    muslim80 |  -0.1872  -0.3340  -0.4205  -0.2355  -0.4033   1.0000 
       avelf |  -0.3957  -0.4376  -0.4494  -0.1042  -0.2608   0.3073   1.0000 
 
Table 26. Correlations between growth and political variables 
             | regulato   growth gdpsh460 school60   assass     revc    civil 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    regulato |   1.0000 
      growth |  -0.0490   1.0000 
    gdpsh460 |   0.1882   0.1769   1.0000 
    school60 |   0.1824   0.4112   0.8194   1.0000 
      assass |   0.1035  -0.1158  -0.0768  -0.1039   1.0000 
        revc |   0.0708  -0.2898  -0.3725  -0.3439   0.4703   1.0000 
       civil |  -0.0870  -0.5134  -0.6990  -0.7137   0.0830   0.4922   1.0000 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table 27. Data Used on the Growth Accounting Exercise 
Year Y K H L Y/L 
      
1970 1 1 1 1 1
1971 1.0528 1.0498 1.0157 1.0601 0.9932
1972 1.0804 1.1233 1.0321 1.0894 0.9917
1973 1.1737 1.2255 1.0479 1.1184 1.0495
1974 1.2828 1.3099 1.0643 1.1471 1.1183
1975 1.3596 1.4272 1.0800 1.2102 1.1235
1976 1.5193 1.6408 1.0750 1.2394 1.2259
1977 1.6157 1.9072 1.0700 1.2682 1.2740
1978 1.8023 2.2870 1.0650 1.2969 1.3896
1979 2.0532 2.7646 1.0600 1.3635 1.5059
1980 2.2360 3.2287 1.0550 1.3928 1.6054
1981 2.4597 3.6908 1.0800 1.4221 1.7296
1982 2.6032 4.1393 1.1050 1.4917 1.7451
1983 2.9996 4.7132 1.1300 1.5218 1.9712
1984 3.2660 5.3724 1.1557 1.5937 2.0492
1985 3.5161 6.0694 1.1807 1.6249 2.1639
1986 3.9906 6.9143 1.2029 1.6945 2.3551
1987 4.4298 8.0317 1.2243 1.7211 2.5738
1988 4.9142 9.5691 1.2464 1.7923 2.7419
1989 5.2801 11.1998 1.2679 1.8197 2.9017
1990 5.1064 12.5551 1.2900 1.8944 2.6955
1991 5.4573 13.7788 1.3021 1.9241 2.8363
1992 5.8592 15.1416 1.3150 2.0018 2.9269
1993 6.5654 16.7818 1.3279 2.0315 3.2318
1994 7.1715 18.5997 1.3400 2.1058 3.4056
1995 7.6675 20.4667 1.3529 2.1267 3.6054
1996 8.6106 22.5466 1.3729 2.1962 3.9207
1997 9.6122 25.0411 1.3929 2.2171 4.3355
1998 10.6943 27.8452 1.4136 2.2893 4.6715
1999 11.3838 31.2231 1.4336 2.3114 4.9252
2000 12.4429 35.4947 1.4543 2.3900 5.2062
 
